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B- Aid is dead. Long live aid!
Jean-Michel Severino
Former CEO of the French Agency of Development,  
President of Investisseur &Partenaire pour le Développement 
Abstract. The concepts, targets, tools, institutions and modes of operation of oficial development assistance 
have been overtaken by the pace of change in a world marked by the combined momentum of demography, 
technology and economic growth.
Aid can however recover, as social consequences of the globalization call for new forms of regulation. It will 
then be necessary to modify and diversify our target-setting processes, to update operating procedures, and to 
ind better ways of measuring policy implementation. Aid volumes will certainly continue to grow, and we 
must transform the way aid is inanced. Public and private aid stakeholders must recognize the importance of 
these transformations and be ready to support them, by questioning the methods as well as the objectives of 
the policies they are implementing. Otherwise, they will severely impede the emergence of the policies we 
need if we are to build a better world.
Keywords. Oficial development assistance, public policy evaluation, Millennium Development Goals.
Aid is a hydra. 
In an article dating back to 2010, I had, with Olivier Ray, 
announced his death. 1
It is conirmed.
Messages of condolences low from people who were 
 supposed to beneit from it: the academic community, gov-
ernments and public opinion–and assistance aid profession-
als–join enthusiastically. The irst group asserts repeatedly 
that they want to reject the weight of policy, deemed exces-
sive: conditionality oppresses, aid lows create dependen-
cy, and corruption is reinforced by them. This is what 
Ms. Dambisa Moyo, in her successful “dead aid”, recently 
told us. Academics also accumulate criticism about its ef-
fectiveness, with a vitality that continues to impress. Some, 
like Mr. Easterly, make indeed a living from this criticism. 
Governments build on views of the irst group, in a time of 
severe economic crisis: when you compress spending, it is 
convenient to accuse the dogs you want to kill of having the 
rage of ineficiency. As a consequence, you can cut spending 
in peace and good conscience: this is what happens every-
where, with the notable and admirable exception of Great 
Britain. The opinions join the concert: they are generous but 
do not believe in public assistance; they can worship NGOs, 
certainly. Unfortunately, NGOs are better at helping directly 
populations in the most pressing humanitarian need than ad-
dressing the dificult and often austere challenges of the 
1 See “The End of ODA” (Oficial Development Assistance), CGDEV, 2009
conditions of their growth. And now aid professionals bring 
a cascade to the water of these mills! In recent years, how 
many conferences, how many meetings, how many memo-
randa on the effectiveness of assistance! Reading them, it is 
understandable that critics of aid feel right and comfortable: 
why would you support a policy whose ineficiency is de-
nounced by its own stakeholders?
1 Life after death 
All the more remarkable, then, is that development aid has 
survived a situation that would have killed off seemingly 
better-founded public policies. The level of aid may not be 
stratospheric, but its growth is nonetheless impressive: it 
 remains at an estimated 126 billion dollars in 2010–a record 
in absolute terms. To this igure, we should add the consider-
able inlow from private sources: foundations and NGOs. 
International solidarity has never been so active.
To understand why, we must look at the motivations. 
During the long Cold War years, post-colonial guilt, along 
with the determination to contain Soviet ambitions in poor 
countries, helped to keep aid at signiicant levels. But with 
the fall of the Berlin wall, international aid lost its geo- 
political underpinnings. The basic core of compassion 
 remained, but it was not enough to justify signiicant com-
mitment from industrialized countries. By the end of the 
decade, however, aid levels were rising again, driven by a 
new awareness, among the leaders of the largest nations, of 
the dangers inherent in the widening inancial gap between 
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rich and poor, of global interdependencies that give rise to 
growing numbers of “collective concerns”, and the role of 
aid in managing or preventing conlict.
We are therefore witnessing a profound change in the 
function of development aid. In fact, we probably ought to 
start calling it something else: “global social policy”, for ex-
ample. And the most profound single change is in its under-
lying interests. In the years leading up to the great wave of 
globalization, when the geopolitical dimension was there 
behind development aid, it wasn’t really all that important 
how well it performed, technically speaking: whether aid 
was effective or not was secondary, so long as it helped to 
shore up friendly regimes. In the 1990s a very different prob-
lem came to the fore; although aid is even now sometimes 
justiied on geopolitical grounds–as we have seen in 
Afghanistan and Iraq–an ever-larger share of aid objectives 
are now focused on speciic problems such as climate warm-
ing, the loss of biodiversity, the spread of HIV/AIDS and 
other major endemic diseases, international inequalities, and 
the like, and are thereby embedded in a whole set of issues 
around the protection, promotion or convergence of inter-
ests. Increasingly, old-style development aid is being mobi-
lized to address the negative externalities of globalization, 
bound up with relations between rich and poor. And there is 
no shortage of such problems! 
2 From global public goods to cargo-dollars
This distinctly new approach can only become more wide-
spread with the growth of the world population, and the 
corresponding increase in the absolute number of poor, 
which will follow as night follows day however rapidly the 
global economy may expand. But a new dimension is 
emerging, one that touches on the way we manage global 
macro-social balances.
It is now becoming clear that the serious inancial (and sub-
sequently economic) crisis of 2007 has, for most poor coun-
tries, permanently scotched the idea that they could found 
their hopes for growth solely on copying the Asian export-
driven model. This clever model enabled a considerable mass 
of people to escape the clutches of poverty. But its extension 
to cover a world population rapidly heading for the 9-billion 
mark is faced with three major challenges: a problem of mac-
roeconomic sustainability, due to the generation of excessive 
inancial imbalances; a problem of social equilibrium, due to 
the growing inequalities that it creates within countries, both 
rich and poor, with the resulting social disruption; and an 
 environmental problem, due to its carbon-intensive nature. 
The alternatives, however, are far from obvious. Develop-
ment models will presumably need to refocus on domestic 
markets, while signiicantly improving energy performance. 
It will be dificult for poor countries that adopt this course to 
achieve this without substantial additional savings to main-
tain their levels of investment–a macroeconomic concern that 
export-led models can more easily afford to ignore. 
In this respect, development aid has a new, rebalancing, 
role to play in international macroeconomic exchanges. The 
emphasis placed on infrastructures by the G20 in Seoul is a 
good sign, particularly relevant to the main concerns of the 
day. It should lead to a radically new form of involvement for 
emerging countries, whose vast international reserves should 
be placed at the service of a new recycling policy: converting 
outdated petrodollars into brand new cargo-dollars. 
If all of the above is even remotely true, then we can de-
duce at least four major conclusions: one, aid objectives will 
become very diverse, and need to be formally modiied; two, 
operating procedures must evolve; three, policy measure-
ment must also modernize and adjust to its content; and four, 
aid volumes will certainly continue to grow, and we must 
transform the way aid is inanced. Let’s take these points one 
by one.
3 Towards millennium goals for globalization
At this point I would like to pay special tribute to Brian 
Atwood, the current Chair of the OECD Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC). When he took over as Administrator 
of USAID, he asked the members of the DAC to relect on 
how to deine a battery of indicators that could be used in 
determining aid objectives. Public perceptions of aid, he felt, 
were undermined by a lack of clarity about what aid was for. 
The resulting work led, through a series of stages, to the po-
litical consecration of what was to become the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).
The hugely successful campaign to publicize the MDGs no 
doubt provided useful ideological backing for political lead-
ers in OECD countries, strengthening their resolve to inance 
the policy, and may have played a supporting role in helping 
to increase public aid budgets, as well as private donations, 
over the last ten years. 
The implementation of the MDGs relects the profound 
changes in the role of development aid that we have been 
discussing. But it only takes us part of the way.
As they stand, the MDGs suffer from a number of technical 
deiciencies: their wording is sometimes unclear; they con-
fuse inal impacts with the means for achieving them; they 
under-value economic growth and income and overvalue so-
cial dimensions; certain policy areas, such as health, are over-
represented, while others (such as energy) are underestimated 
or simply ignored. These issues can easily be resolved, but 
they do create a number of political problems in practice.
The most important issue with the MDGs, however, goes 
beyond that. In 2015, when the time comes to replace the 
MDGs, the new goals will need to represent common global 
ambitions for a shared public policy. The MDGs remain root-
ed in a social approach to the world. There is not much room 
in their paradigm for global public goods or, in general, for 
the whole range of “collective concerns” about relations be-
tween rich and poor in this world.
If we want these new millennium goals–which will not be 
just about development, but about the entire planet–to have 
still greater legitimacy, to be relevant to the realities of pub-
lic policy, to effectively mobilize support, and to be measur-
able in performance terms, then we need to make progress in 
two directions.
The irst is to identify the ultimate objectives that we all 
want to achieve within a set timeframe, say 15 or 30 years: 
reducing mortality and morbidity; increasing life expectancy; 
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improving incomes and, at least equally important in our 
global context, narrowing inequalities; and reducing our 
 environmental footprint. 
It is particularly important to clarify these key objectives, 
because they can be achieved by various political means: in-
comes can be improved by health policy; infant mortality can 
be reduced by good water management as well as increased 
household earnings; biodiversity can be encouraged by urban 
policies, and carbon emissions can be abated by a trading 
policy. In short, it is important to dissociate end objectives 
from ground-level policies, in order to disrupt the lobbies be-
hind each speciic objective. We must look beyond the social 
group that seeks dominion over that area of policy, and focus 
on what we really seek to achieve.
The other change we need to make in the MDGs is to 
 reconcile them with the rights movement. The movement is 
gaining momentum: rights to water, education, health… It 
demands universal access to these goods–not just less in-
equality of access, like the existing MDGs–and these de-
mands are gaining increasing political recognition. We should 
therefore identify, in addition to the major impact targets 
mentioned above, a series of sector policies aimed at making 
each particular service universal. Access to health, education, 
water, energy and nature could be the ive pillars, for exam-
ple–the ive basic services to which any human on this earth 
should have access. The role of the MDGs would be to set the 
pace of universal implementation, through a collective effort, 
necessarily involving every country on earth.
2015 will soon be upon us. But the international commu-
nity has only modestly begun to focus on what is one of the 
world’s major public policy issues: the formulation of our 
shared, long-term goals–goals which must reconcile the 
 social approach with the public goods approach. It is time 
to concentrate on developing a strategy that will enable us 
to synchronize our instruments and project into the future.
4 Transforming operating procedures:  
 from lifeline to bottom line
One of the most important problems with the way global pub-
lic policies are organized is that intervention is restricted 
solely to aid. Before I get started on the vexatious question of 
the way aid is currently measured–we will come to that short-
ly–let me just say that there is all too often a direct link made 
between the MDGs, on the one hand, and aid, on the other, as 
if aid were the only way of achieving our goals for the planet. 
This point actually encompasses two complementary but 
separate topics.
The irst is linked to the scope of the instruments we use, 
frequently treated as a question of consistency between 
MDGs, or between aid and other government policies. In re-
ality, achieving the MDGs depends irst and foremost on the 
policies implemented by each country and only secondly on 
the means implemented by the international community in 
support of domestic policies. These can cover diverse terrain 
from trade, investment and inance to migration, research 
policy, diplomacy, and even military involvement. In fact, 
each OECD country should be able to report on the full 
range of support it delivers, and not just on the volume of aid 
provided. This route has been recently explored by the 
CGD’s Commitment to Development Index.
The second topic relates more speciically to the instru-
ments of inancial intervention. Here, also, the OECD coun-
tries, and indeed civil society, are using an ever-wider variety 
of instruments, with increasing levels of inancial innovation. 
But the OECD reporting mechanisms on the volume and qual-
ity of aid discourage innovation: they tend to restrict it to a 
limited number of instruments. Once again, OECD countries 
should be able to report on the full panoply of measures em-
ployed to support poor countries on the path to attaining the 
MDGs, and not just on the instruments (namely donations and 
loans) that have assumed sacrosanct status since the 1970s.
In a growing number of cases, in fact, aid–in the strictest 
sense of the word–is not necessarily the most effective way of 
contributing to the fulillment of the MDGs. 
One example: Sub-Saharan Africa’s energy deicit proba-
bly costs that continent one to two annual growth points. 
Unblocking this bottleneck would represent an invaluable 
contribution to incomes, health and gender equality; and even 
for the climate, if the challenge were to be met by using clean 
energy. But for the most part, the instruments required would 
not be counted as aid: and yet the transformation of public 
policies and the provision of incentives–through guarantee 
schemes, for example, or through actions to strengthen local 
capital markets–to get local and international private inance 
to invest in this area would be worth more than billions of 
dollars of aid. 
Another example: social innovation–which combines the 
aims of economic growth, social cohesion and public policy 
eficacy–relies, in many of the poorest countries, on the pro-
motion of social entrepreneurship or “social business”. This 
category, which has a special dynamic in the ield, should 
not be subsidized (the services it offers must ind their own 
economic equilibrium), but nor can it be inanced by the 
instruments of conventional capitalism. The ight against 
poverty and the promotion of biodiversity will, if they are to 
prevail, depend on a massive expansion in this range of in-
struments. They cannot be addressed through the conven-
tional categories of aid.
This brings us back to the core challenges: deining objec-
tives, measuring results against the objectives, and determin-
ing the best mix of sector and inancial policy measures to 
achieve them.
5 Using measurements to evaluate,  
 rather than determine, policy
Let us now turn our attention to inancial lows. Our current pub-
lic policy is not measured, and therefore we cannot  understand, 
explain or defend it–or only with very rough approximations.
Measuring public policy involves a number of steps that 
are simple in principle but always dificult in reality: one, 
determining the objectives; two, identifying the volumes of 
each inancial instrument used; three, evaluating their budget 
cost; and four, comparing them to the results obtained.
Oficial deinitions of aid mask considerable confusion be-
tween steps two and three. For many reporting countries, 
there is a signiicant difference between the volumes declared 
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and their real budget cost. This might be due, for example 
(but not exclusively), to the way loans and debt cancellations 
are accounted for. None of this would matter very much if 
these accounting modalities weren’t such a determining 
 factor in behaviors: everything that can be measured has an 
impact on policy-making.
A review of aid accounting is a priority if we are to elimi-
nate irrational behavior and clearly distinguish between bud-
get costs incurred by the taxpayer and the total volume of 
inancial commitments of any kind undertaken to achieve 
speciic results. The clariication of this chain is essential to 
enable informed debate on the contribution of inancial aid 
to the implementation of any given policy. 
6 New ways of financing public policy
With regard speciically to aid volumes, the scope of global 
public policies will need to expand greatly in the decades 
to come. 
This expansion will no doubt occur regardless of how 
quickly the economies of developing countries grow. In our 
globalized world, the question of who pays for public policy 
will certainly evolve, just as it has within our domestic 
boundaries: payments will be determined not by absolute 
 levels of poverty or wealth, but by relative levels. For de-
cades to come, our planet will continue to be characterized by 
inancial inequalities between countries, and so the richest 
countries will have to continue to inance the poorest.
The scope of public policy will increase in two ways. 
Firstly, the number of subjects of “collective concern” will 
grow in line with the upward curve of world population, the 
increasing density of the planet, and the accumulation of 
problems in managing the relationship between man and 
 nature in general; and secondly, these problems will grow 
in intensity.
The level of payments levied on the wealthy for the beneit of 
the poor must necessarily increase, for three simple reasons. 
First, global policies will above all address global public 
goods. On this score, the poor countries are at once the vic-
tim (suffering the consequences of climate change induced 
by others), the cause (as by far the main locus of AIDS and 
conlict) and the solution (their biodiversity is vital). Because 
we need the developing countries to resolve a number of 
“collective concerns”, we will accept the need to pay them 
due compensation. 
Second, public policies will focus on the countries with 
the weakest potential for globalization. With nine billion 
people on Earth − eight of them in emerging and developing 
countries, including more than ive in China and India, and 
two in sub-Saharan Africa − the political sustainability of 
globalization lies in its ability to marshal a large number of 
countries in a world-wide drive for growth. Countries will be 
increasingly willing to pay for this outcome, and this will 
focus traditional development aid on growth. 
Third and last, there are parts of the world that will not be 
invited to come to the ball of global prosperity any time soon, 
due to political dificulties, isolation, and other factors. Even 
under the best-case scenario, the world of 2050 will still be 
home to more than a billion people living in absolute poverty. 
In the global, integrated economic space that is now being 
built, it will be necessary to establish−oficially or unoficially− 
a global redistribution policy. This comprehensive social 
safety net will be required for the duration, and it will be 
 crucial to managing the geopolitical problems arising from 
the exclusion of large sections of the planet. 
Crisis management and prevention will, in many cases, 
dictate the ground rules for redistribution. But the social se-
curity safety net will be much wider than that: as things stand 
already, the way the MDGs are deined makes them unattain-
able even for relatively well-run poor countries. Massive i-
nancial support is needed, and will continue to be needed, to 
enable their populations to access the basic human needs− 
increasingly recognized as basic human rights−we described 
earlier. In the future, this need for support will grow as the 
weight of demography and global inequalities increase. 
The widening scope of public policy–and the growing 
 pricetag–will have implications for how aid is funded. Until 
now, the budgets of OECD countries have been the sole 
source of funding for public assistance. This situation is go-
ing to have to change, and for one very simple reason: the 
poor in rich countries will be increasingly less willing to pay 
for the rich in poor countries. 
As we stated before, the evolution of the international econ-
omy is not only characterized by the emergence of formerly 
poor countries and by the persistence of a large number of very 
poor countries; it is also exempliied by the accentuation of 
inequalities within each category of country, including in the 
industrialized world. Never before have gaps in wealth been so 
evident. In the coming decades, persistent situations of ex-
treme poverty − and increasing numbers of people in absolute 
poverty − may prove to be perfectly consistent with relatively 
high economic growth, even in the poorest countries. They 
also may be consistent with an increasingly large wealthy elite, 
especially in the poorest countries. This planetary structure 
will gradually shift the burden of funding “social welfare”, 
“development” and “global public goods” onto the rich, be 
they in poor, emerging or industrialized countries.
This is why international taxation has a promising future.
The emergence of international taxation has been somewhat 
clumsily described as the advent of “innovative inance” in 
the ield of development. But there is nothing innovative about 
taxation–it is as old as the world! Its extension beyond na-
tional boundaries has something of the inevitability of gravity. 
The search for new bases of taxation − targeting the world’s 
afluent or wealthy classes − will necessarily lead to interna-
tional taxes. As it may take a very long time to develop an in-
ternational income tax, a wide variety of targets for taxation 
will be reviewed; but the focus will be on property or transac-
tions used by the world’s “rich”. Many possibilities are al-
ready being studied: taxation on air trafic, international tran-
sit, carbon dealing… in fact, many options are already in play.
There is a certain ideological fuzziness surrounding the 
global debate on international taxation. Some of its promot-
ers have been accused of trying to cover up the unwillingness 
of a number of rich countries to meet their aid obligations. 
But the issue is much more serious than that. The aid budgets 
of OECD governments will remain indispensable in the ight 
against global poverty for a long time to come, and indeed 
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will continue to represent the majority of funding. It will also 
be fully legitimate for countries with national interests at 
stake to continue funding development assistance through a 
call to their own citizens: for Europe, for example, the fate of 
the south-shore Mediterranean countries is a vital regional 
issue that warrants international involvement. But in the long 
run, we will have to recognize the impressive transformation 
of the social structures of our planet, which requires changing 
our more than 60-year-old funding systems: they need to at-
tune to the fact that we are now facing global challenges that 
render national boundaries meaningless.
7 By way of a non-conclusion
Yes, aid is a hydra. It could even be called a “born-again” policy.
Although aid, in its historical sense, is dead, it is living a 
new life in the form of global policies that the 21st century 
must put in place simply to survive. A world of nine billion 
people, with a society that is integrated economically and i-
nancially, needs public policies to regulate its markets, allow 
people to live in peace and ensure the progressive extension 
of prosperity to all. 
These global policies on environmental, economic and 
social issues involve costs, and these costs must rest on the 
shoulders of the world’s wealthiest citizens. In the world of 
the future, the wealthy will not live only in OECD coun-
tries; they will live all around the world, including in the 
poorest countries. 
Of course, the operational targets of these policies still, in 
the vast majority of cases, focus on the poorest countries and 
seek to beneit the poorest people. In future, however, they 
will increasingly need to be designed to deal with ever more 
complex externalities, as well as the growing links between 
the social condition of the poor in the developing countries 
and that of the poor in OECD countries. 
Today, aid’s concepts, targets, tools, institutions and oper-
ating modes have been overtaken by changes occurring in a 
world characterized by the combined momentum of demog-
raphy, technology, and economic growth. Public and private 
aid stakeholders must recognize the importance of these 
transformations and be ready to fall in step, questioning the 
methods as well as the objectives of the policies they serve. 
Otherwise, they will slow down the emergence of the policies 
we need if we are to build a better world. Old aid and its part-
ners have a major role to play in building that new world. 
That is the challenge we must face. 
Are we up to the task? 
